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On the optimal allocation of prizes in contests
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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Yoon, K. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-05T16:10:49Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-09-05T16:10:49Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1229-2893 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/100820 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results. | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.publisher | Korean Econometric Society | - |
| dc.title | On the optimal allocation of prizes in contests | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Yoon, K. | - |
| dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84896972696 | - |
| dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.25, no.1, pp.1 - 12 | - |
| dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
| dc.citation.title | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 25 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
| dc.citation.startPage | 1 | - |
| dc.citation.endPage | 12 | - |
| dc.type.rims | ART | - |
| dc.type.docType | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.kciid | ART001859635 | - |
| dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
| dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
| dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | All-pay auctions | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Contests | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Optimal structure | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Prizes | - |
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