Strategic analysis of influence peddling
- Authors
- Majumdar, Mukul; Yoo, Seung Han
- Issue Date
- 11월-2012
- Publisher
- SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
- Keywords
- Revolving doors; Signaling games; Repeated games
- Citation
- INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.41, no.4, pp.737 - 762
- Indexed
- SCIE
SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
- Volume
- 41
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 737
- End Page
- 762
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/107053
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00182-012-0340-z
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
- Abstract
- This paper analyzes "influence peddling" in a model that portrays interactions involving human capital transfer and collusion-building, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that there exists a collusion maximizing equilibrium between a sequence of "qualified" regulators and a firm such that the qualified bureaucrat manipulates regulation rates for two firms by regulating the colluding firm leniently for the maximized sum of their payoffs, but regulating the non-colluding firm stringently for the signaling in order to "compensate" for the lenient regulatory stance taken toward the colluding firm.
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