Detecting Heap-Spraying Code Injection Attacks in Malicious Web Pages Using Runtime Execution

Abstract

The growing use of web services is increasing web browser attacks exponentially. Most attacks use a technique called heap spraying because of its high success rate. Heap spraying executes a malicious code without indicating the exact address of the code by copying it into many heap objects. For this reason, the attack has a high potential to succeed if only the vulnerability is exploited. Thus, attackers have recently begun using this technique because it is easy to use JavaScript to allocate the heap memory area. This paper proposes a novel technique that detects heap spraying attacks by executing a heap object in a real environment, irrespective of the version and patch status of the web browser. This runtime execution is used to detect various forms of heap spraying attacks, such as encoding and polymorphism. Heap objects are executed after being filtered on the basis of patterns of heap spraying attacks in order to reduce the overhead of the runtime execution. Patterns of heap spraying attacks are based on analysis of how an web browser accesses benign web sites. The heap objects are executed forcibly by changing the instruction register into the address of them after being loaded into memory. Thus, we can execute the malicious code without having to consider the version and patch status of the browser. An object is considered to contain a malicious code if the execution reaches a call instruction and then the instruction accesses the API of system libraries, such as kernel32.dll and ws_32.dll. To change registers and monitor execution flow, we used a debugger engine. A prototype, named HERAD(HEap spRAying Detector), is implemented and evaluated. In experiments, HERAD detects various forms of exploit code that an emulation cannot detect, and some heap spraying attacks that NOZZLE cannot detect. Although it has an execution overhead. HERAD produces a low number of false alarms. The processing time of several minutes is negligible because our research focuses on detecting heap spraying. This research can be applied to existing systems that collect malicious codes, such as Honeypot.