Power-sharing and democracy promotion in post-civil war peace-building

Abstract

Why do peace and democracy not often go together in countries emerging from violent civil conflicts? If the promotion of peace and democracy are conflicting objectives, what are the sources of the problem? Based on the conceptual distinction between short-term peace-making and long-term peace-building that incorporates democracy promotion as an essential component, this article argues that peace-making and democracy promotion often constitute a conflictual relationship when external actors impose a particular set of institutional arrangements - namely, power-sharing agreements - in order to end civil war as quickly as possible. The sharing of power between governments and rebels can be effective at reducing the security dilemma and credible commitment problems in the transition from civil war to peace, but it is a short-term solution and a source of the conflict between peace-making and democracy promotion. This is because power-sharing builds wartime divisions into post-war political structures and provides a strong incentive for former warring parties to garner political support primarily from their own constituent groups. The persistence of wartime cleavages tends to lower public confidence in newly established governmental institutions. Thus, power-sharing is likely to function as an institutional barrier to the establishment of democracy in the long run. This article demonstrates the adverse effects of power-sharing on democracy promotion by analysing post-civil war electoral politics and public attitudes toward former warring parties and governmental institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.