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미국 델라웨어주 회사법이 우리 회사법에 미친 영향The Influence of Delaware Corporate Law on the Korean Company Law

Other Titles
The Influence of Delaware Corporate Law on the Korean Company Law
Authors
김정호
Issue Date
2012
Publisher
한국경영법률학회
Keywords
경영판단의 원칙(Business Judgement Standard); 케어막기준(Caremark Standard); 의심할 만한 사유 기준(Red-Flag Test); 소수주식의 강제매수(Sqeeze-out); 경영상 목적(Valid Business Purpose); 지배구조의 수렴(Convergence in Corporate Governance); 기능적 수렴(Functional Convergence); 형태적 수렴(Formal Convergence); 계약적 수렴(Contractual Convergence); 경로의존성 이론(Path Dependency Theory); 지배구조결정의 문화사회적 요소(Socio-cultural Factor in Corporate Governance)
Citation
경영법률, v.23, no.1, pp.127 - 171
Indexed
KCI
Journal Title
경영법률
Volume
23
Number
1
Start Page
127
End Page
171
URI
https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/110460
ISSN
1229-3261
Abstract
Nobody denies nowadays in Korea, that the Delaware Corporate Law has been firmly rooted in this region. Due to the long-lasting political and economic ties between the two nations, the convergence in corporate governance is to be easily ongoing. Especially in the field of fiduciary duty of directors and officers, normally at the publicly held corporations in Korea, this trend seems to be at the highest level. The business judgement standard, Caremark standard and the so called 'Red-flag'-test have been firmly introduced in various judicial reviews in Korea. Furthermore in takeover-law for example, we can see the same trend in the famous court case of "Hyundai Elevator" from the Korean District Court of Suwon (Yeo-ju Sub-District), where the judge used the 'Unocal'-standard for his reasoning. The "valid business purpose"-test in the sqeeze-out cases was also implemented in the revised ( in the year of 2011) Korean Commercial Code Book. As a limitating factor to the phenomenon "convergence in corporate governance" in the region, we can, first of all, point out the geological difference, which is released from the two nations. In U.S., the reasonable-thinking shareholders of publicly held corporations never attend to the shareholders' meeting due to the 'cost and time'-problem. But in Korea, a shareholder can visit his or her shareholders' meeting with ease. So the litigation over the procedural defectness from the resolutions of shareholder meeting is so popular in the region as the derivative suit in U. S. Until now the convergence has been always on the one-way path ; namely from U. S. to Korea. But in future the author hopes a convergence in corporate governance between the nations through a interacting way.
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