An efficient CRT-RSA algorithm secure against power and fault attacks
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Sung-Kyoung | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Tae Hyun | - |
dc.contributor.author | Han, Dong-Guk | - |
dc.contributor.author | Hong, Seokhie | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-07T07:56:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-07T07:56:12Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-18 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011-10 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0164-1212 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/111502 | - |
dc.description.abstract | RSA digital signatures based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) are subject to power and fault attacks. In particular, modular exponentiation and CRT recombination are prone to both attacks. However, earlier countermeasures are susceptible to the possibility of advanced and sophisticated attacks. In this paper, we investigate state-of-the-art countermeasures against power and fault attacks from the viewpoint of security and efficiency. Then, we show possible vulnerabilities to fault attacks. Finally, we propose new modular exponentiation and CRT recombination algorithms secure against all known power and fault attacks. Our proposal improves efficiency by replacing arithmetic operations with logical ones to check errors in the CRT recombination step. In addition, since our CRT-RSA algorithm does not require knowledge of the public exponent, it guarantees a more versatile implementation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC | - |
dc.subject | RESISTANCE | - |
dc.subject | CHECKING | - |
dc.title | An efficient CRT-RSA algorithm secure against power and fault attacks | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Hong, Seokhie | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jss.2011.04.026 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-79960840652 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000294573000006 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, v.84, no.10, pp.1660 - 1669 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE | - |
dc.citation.volume | 84 | - |
dc.citation.number | 10 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 1660 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 1669 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Computer Science | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Computer Science, Software Engineering | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Computer Science, Theory & Methods | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | RESISTANCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CHECKING | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Factorization attack | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Fault attack | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Checking procedure | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Simple power analysis | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Differential power analysis | - |
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
(02841) 서울특별시 성북구 안암로 14502-3290-1114
COPYRIGHT © 2021 Korea University. All Rights Reserved.
Certain data included herein are derived from the © Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics. All rights reserved.
You may not copy or re-distribute this material in whole or in part without the prior written consent of Clarivate Analytics.