Endogenous Lobbying and Protection under Monopolistic Competition
- Authors
- Chung, Jaiho
- Issue Date
- 2011
- Publisher
- ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
- Keywords
- Monopolistic competition; quadratic utility; linear demand; cross-price elasticity
- Citation
- GLOBAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, v.40, no.3, pp.315 - 322
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- GLOBAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
- Volume
- 40
- Number
- 3
- Start Page
- 315
- End Page
- 322
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/114980
- DOI
- 10.1080/1226508X.2011.601640
- ISSN
- 1226-508X
- Abstract
- This paper studies the "Protection for Sale" model in the setting of monopolistic competition drawing on the quadratic sub-utility model. This model generates two new findings: (1) the average cross-price elasticity, in particular, only among foreign varieties in a sector negatively influences the level of protection; (2) the total number of domestic varieties over one of the foreign varieties in a sector, a new proxy for political power of domestic lobby groups in that sector, positively influences the level of protection.
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Collections - Korea University Business School > Department of Business Administration > 1. Journal Articles
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