Product announcement and reputation in a cheap talk game
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Choi, J.P. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Nahm, J. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-08T09:25:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-08T09:25:33Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1229-2893 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/118346 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Firms keep introducing new products in markets. In making a buy-or-wait decision, consumers rely on information provided by firms. In a cheap-talk game model (i.e., Crawford and Sobel (1982)), we identify a simple informative equilibrium, in which firms make a discrete announcement, either low or high quality, even though product quality space is continuous. We characterize the equilibrium properties and evaluate its welfare effects. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.title | Product announcement and reputation in a cheap talk game | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Nahm, J. | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-79251562184 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.21, no.4, pp.59 - 78 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.volume | 21 | - |
dc.citation.number | 4 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 59 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 78 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001501898 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Cheap talk | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Product announcements | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Reputation | - |
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