The Effects of Deferred Compensation and Performance-based Compensation on Firm Value
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Byun, Dong Heon | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jinbae | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shin, Joon Yong | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-08T18:16:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-08T18:16:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009-04 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1608-1625 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 2164-2257 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/120274 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study empirically investigates the effects of two incentive systems: (i) the deferred compensation system, which involves paying lower (higher) compensation than the industry average during employees' early (later) service periods; and (ii) the performance-based compensation system. Empirical results using employee-wage data from Korean firms show that both the deferred compensation system and the performance-based compensation system have positive associations with firth value measured by Tobin's Q. However, the associations between the two types of incentive system and other value-relevant factors are not uniform. While the deferred compensation system contributes to the enhancement of ROA and an improvement in labor productivity, the performance-based compensation system stimulates sales growth. | - |
dc.format.extent | 19 | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.language.iso | ENG | - |
dc.publisher | ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD | - |
dc.title | The Effects of Deferred Compensation and Performance-based Compensation on Firm Value | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.publisher.location | 영국 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/16081625.2009.9720829 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-70349266833 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000275018400003 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, v.16, no.1, pp 49 - 67 | - |
dc.citation.title | ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 16 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 49 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 67 | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKET | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | AGENCY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EARNINGS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | KOREA | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | compensation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | incentive | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | deferred compensation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | performance | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | firm value | - |
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