Practical Password-Authenticated Three-Party Key Exchange
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kwon, Jeong Ok | - |
dc.contributor.author | Jeong, Ik Rae | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Dong Hoon | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T01:24:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T01:24:15Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-10 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008-12-25 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1976-7277 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/122197 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Password-based authentication key exchange (PAKE) protocols in the literature typically assume a password that is shared between a client and a server. PAKE has been applied in various environments, especially in the "client-server" applications of remotely accessed systems, such as e-banking. With the rapid developments in modern communication environments, such as ad-hoc networks and ubiquitous computing, it is customary to construct a secure peer-to-peer channel, which is quite a different paradigm from existing paradigms. In such a peer-to-peer channel, it would be much more common for users to not share a password with others. In this paper, we consider password-based authentication key exchange in the three-party setting, where two users do not share a password between themselves but only with one server. The users make a session-key by using their different passwords with the help of the server. We propose an efficient password-based authentication key exchange protocol with different passwords that achieves forward secrecy in the standard model. The protocol requires parties to only memorize human-memorable passwords; all other information that is necessary to run the protocol is made public. The protocol is also light-weighted, i.e., it requires only three rounds and four modular exponentiations per user. In fact, this amount of computation and the number of rounds are comparable to the most efficient password-based authentication key exchange protocol in the random-oracle model. The dispensation of random oracles in the protocol does not require the security of any expensive signature schemes or zero-knowlegde proofs. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | KSII-KOR SOC INTERNET INFORMATION | - |
dc.title | Practical Password-Authenticated Three-Party Key Exchange | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Jeong, Ik Rae | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Lee, Dong Hoon | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.3837/tiis.2008.06.003 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-67650222431 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000270933500003 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, v.2, no.6, pp.312 - 332 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS | - |
dc.citation.title | KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 2 | - |
dc.citation.number | 6 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 312 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 332 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article; Proceedings Paper | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001337132 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Computer Science | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Telecommunications | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Computer Science, Information Systems | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Telecommunications | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Cryptography | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | provably security | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | key exchange | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | three-party setting | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | dictionary attacks | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | undetectable dictionary attacks | - |
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