Why do Shareholders Allow Their Managers to be Gatekeepers in Corporate Control Contests?
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Park, Kyung Suh | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T01:59:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T01:59:03Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-10 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008-12 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1226-1165 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/122278 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper formulates a theoretical model to explain why target shareholders under corporate control contests allow their managers to play the role of a gatekeeper despite the conflicting incentive of the managers to resist takeover attempts that might increase firm value. The paper claims that sometimes the existence of a manager with a conflicting goal can contribute to enhancing the welfare of his shareholders under a corporate control contest where bidders have the choice of takeover methods. We set up a game-theoretical model and derive a separating equilibrium where bidders with higher synergy prefer a tender offer to a merger, and the bidders are forced to pay higher takeover premium in a hostile tender offer due to the existence of informed target managers who can make counteroffers under a merger deal. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | KOREAN SECURITIES ASSOC | - |
dc.subject | MARKET | - |
dc.subject | WEALTH | - |
dc.title | Why do Shareholders Allow Their Managers to be Gatekeepers in Corporate Control Contests? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Park, Kyung Suh | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.2041-6156.2008.tb00003.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84855243838 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000262331000003 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, v.37, no.6, pp.1065 - 1090 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | - |
dc.citation.title | ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | - |
dc.citation.volume | 37 | - |
dc.citation.number | 6 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 1065 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 1090 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001299275 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKET | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | WEALTH | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Takeover Method | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Merger | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Tender Offer | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Takeover Premium | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Agency Problem | - |
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