Security analysis of the full-round DDO-64 block cipher
- Authors
- Lee, Changhoon; Kim, Jongsung; Hong, Seokhie; Sung, Jaechul; Lee, Sangjin
- Issue Date
- 12월-2008
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
- Keywords
- Cryptography; Block cipher; Related-key attack; Differential attack; Boomerang attack; Data-dependent operation
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, v.81, no.12, pp.2328 - 2335
- Indexed
- SCIE
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE
- Volume
- 81
- Number
- 12
- Start Page
- 2328
- End Page
- 2335
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/122301
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jss.2008.04.039
- ISSN
- 0164-1212
- Abstract
- DDO-64 is a 64-bit Feistel-like block cipher based on data-dependent operations (DDOs). It is composed of 8 rounds and uses a 128-bit key. There are two versions of DDO-64, named DDO-64V(1) and DDO-64V(2), according to the key schedule. They were designed under an attempt for improving the security and performance of DDP-based ciphers. In this paper, however, we show that like most of the existing DDP-based ciphers, DDO-64V(1) and DDO-64V(2) are also vulnerable to related-key attacks. The attack on DDO-64V(1) requires 2(35.5) related-key chosen plaintexts and 2(63.5) encryptions while the attack on DDO-64V(2) only needs 8 related-key chosen plaintexts and 2(31) encryptions: our attacks are both mainly due to their simple key schedules and structural weaknesses. These works are the first known cryptanalytic results on DDO-64V(1) and DDO-64V(2) so far. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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