Endogenous group formation
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ahn, T. K. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Isaac, R. Mark | - |
dc.contributor.author | Salmon, Timothy C. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T09:45:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T09:45:39Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-10 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008-04 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1467-9779 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/123824 | - |
dc.description.abstract | While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in exogenously fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public-goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry/exit, restricted entry with free exit, and free entry with restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group-level outcomes. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | WILEY | - |
dc.subject | PUBLIC-GOODS | - |
dc.subject | GROUP-SIZE | - |
dc.subject | COOPERATION | - |
dc.subject | PUNISHMENT | - |
dc.subject | PROVISION | - |
dc.title | Endogenous group formation | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Ahn, T. K. | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00357.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-40349098326 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000253629700001 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, v.10, no.2, pp.171 - 194 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY | - |
dc.citation.volume | 10 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 171 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 194 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PUBLIC-GOODS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | GROUP-SIZE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COOPERATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PUNISHMENT | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PROVISION | - |
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
(02841) 서울특별시 성북구 안암로 14502-3290-1114
COPYRIGHT © 2021 Korea University. All Rights Reserved.
Certain data included herein are derived from the © Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics. All rights reserved.
You may not copy or re-distribute this material in whole or in part without the prior written consent of Clarivate Analytics.