Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ahn, Scongje | - |
dc.contributor.author | Rhim, Hosun | - |
dc.contributor.author | Seog, S. Hun | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T12:03:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T12:03:04Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-15 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008-01-16 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0377-2217 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/124230 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Relationships between an assembler and a vendor in a supply chain are investigated in two-period models when the assembler wants to reduce response time by incentive systems. The assembler may offer myopic or farsighted incentive contracts to the vendor, under short-term or long-term relationships. Incentive schemes, effort levels, and expected payoffs under different perspectives and relationships are examined. We find that a farsighted assembler provides the vendor with a higher incentive than a myopic assembler in the first period. A long (short)-term relationship is preferred if the value of farsightedness under a long-term relationship is greater (less) than the switching option value under a short-term relationship. We propose several sufficient conditions regarding which perspectives and relationships are preferred. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | - |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | - |
dc.title | Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Rhim, Hosun | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.10.049 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-34548539225 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000250078100018 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, v.184, no.2, pp.652 - 666 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | - |
dc.citation.title | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | - |
dc.citation.volume | 184 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 652 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 666 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Operations Research & Management Science | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Management | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Operations Research & Management Science | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MORAL HAZARD | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | supply chain management | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | response time | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | incentive scheme | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | contract | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | long-term and short-term relationships | - |
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