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Globally Optimal R&D Subsidy Policy:An Economist's View on the WTO Subsidy AgreementGlobally Optimal R&D Subsidy Policy:An Economist's View on the WTO Subsidy Agreement
- Other Titles
- Globally Optimal R&D Subsidy Policy:An Economist's View on the WTO Subsidy Agreement
- Authors
- 강문성
- Issue Date
- 2008
- Publisher
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Keywords
- Strategic Trade Policy; R& D subsidies; WTO; Strategic Trade Policy; R& D subsidies; WTO
- Citation
- Journal of Economic Integration, v.23, no.2, pp.346 - 359
- Indexed
- KCI
- Journal Title
- Journal of Economic Integration
- Volume
- 23
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 346
- End Page
- 359
- ISSN
- 1225-651X
- Abstract
- We provide economic backgrounds to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under the World Trade Organization. Permitting R&D subsidy under Article 8 of the Agreement can be interpreted as an inefficient victory of an individual exporting country in the non-cooperative game, harnessing strategic relationship over a foreign rival firm into its domestic industrial policy. In addition, we show that the expiration of Article 8 can be understood as a result of the global optimum, where we maximize the sum of welfares over exporting and importing countries in the symmetric case with a linear demand. JEL classification: F10, F13
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