CSCE 참여국의 전략적 이익과 협상 경과: 소련의 입장을 중심으로
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 우평균 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T14:36:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T14:36:44Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1738-0154 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/124970 | - |
dc.description.abstract | It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has been proposed for security Council in Europe like CSCE for a long time, with the general understandings of CSCE foundation. This paper has a purpose to grasp the strategic interests of Soviet Union in the process of CSCE establishment and the meanings of Soviet Union’s participation in the negotiation process. For the Soviets, the CSCE was a key step in a broad strategy to consolidate their hold on Eastern Europe and to win an additional measure of influence over Western Europe. The CSCE was the most far-reaching, concrete initiative undertaken by the Soviets in carrying out her so called, “peace program.” The Communist party was obliged by its own policies to convene its Twenty-fifth Congress, and a successful CSCE was all but essential to demonstrate that the Soviet government had correctly carried out the party’s policies. The CSCE also had long been a subject of intense personal interest and commitment for Brezhnev. For accomplishing her objectives, Soviet Union’s strategy was to evidently overwhelm the other delegations, to create an irresitible momentum to finish the negotiations, to rush through the work in a general way, and to avoid being tied down in terms of time or language to any very specific discussions or agreements. The Soviets exhorted the Conference to move ahead more rapidly with its work and belittled all efforts to evoke specified as attempts to sidetrack the historic significance of the Conference into meaningless details. These tactics found a certain sympathy among many delegates, she felt the negotiations bogging down. Nevertheless, the CSCE’s role as a continuing European institution still has a dynamic enterprise. This institution is broad in scope and membership. flexible, and resistant to the moods of international relations. It has become a forum for debate and discussion between East and West, neutral and engaged, small and large countries, and has proven itself capable of positive contributions, even during periods of East-West tension. It has not been subverted to Soviet objectives—on the contrary, it has been used to advance many Western views—and its possibilities are far from exhausted. | - |
dc.language | Korean | - |
dc.language.iso | ko | - |
dc.publisher | 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원 | - |
dc.title | CSCE 참여국의 전략적 이익과 협상 경과: 소련의 입장을 중심으로 | - |
dc.title.alternative | Strategic Interests of CSCE Countries and the Process of Negotiation: Soviet Union’s Case | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | 우평균 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | 국제관계연구, v.13, no.2, pp.73 - 99 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | 국제관계연구 | - |
dc.citation.title | 국제관계연구 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 13 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 73 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 99 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001277681 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 2 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | other | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | CSCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 헬싱키 프로세스 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 소련 전략 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 데탕트 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 유럽안보 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | CSCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Helsinki Process | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Strategy of Soviet Union | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Detente | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Security of Europe | - |
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