Aurelian’s Military Reforms and the Power Dynamics of the Near East

Abstract

This study seeks to provide a new understanding and explanation of how the Roman emperor Aurelian managed to regain and re-establish control over the eastern provinces of the Empire during the short period of his reign, 270-275 CE. My primary focus is on his military reforms. Previously, these reforms have been considered a mere continuation of Gallienus’ policies with few new initiatives. Gallienus’ creation of the mobile field army, combining infantry with cavalry, was originally an ad hoc measure to enhance manoeuvrability and allow the Roman army to confront the Carpi, the Danubian Goths, and the Black Sea Goths simultaneously, and to contain Postumus’ Gallic Empire. I argue that Aurelian modified and reformed this mobile field army to suit his campaigns in the eastern provinces. My secondary focus is on understanding the details of the relations and rivalries between the dominant imperial powers in the Near East. In this period being examined, the territory where Rome and Sassanid Persia competed became the arena of a struggle which grew to involve other regional powers. These included the oasis state of Palmyra and also the Kingdom of Armenia whose existence seems to have been ignored by scholars because of the Persian occupation there which was then followed by an interregnum from 252 to 279. In terms of Aurelian’s military reforms, the Roman emperor innovatively increased the number of heavy-armed mailed cavalry, while Gallienus restructured his army into a cavalry-centric mobile field army. For Aurelian’s Palmyrene campaign the offensive capability and manoeuvrability of his expeditionary force were paramount because he had to give the Sassanid Persia no room to intervene in his war. Other than the legions, Aurelian also extensively employed the equites, the Roman cataphractarii, and the eastern ethnic clibanarii and cavalry archers. Although the power dynamics of the Near East were unfavourable to him and prevented him from recruiting heavy-armed cavalrymen from the usual areas, he was able to draw on the refugees of the Arsacid Armenians and Parthians to compensate. The employment of the Armenian and Parthian units, clibanarii and mounted archers, was a crucial factor to Aurelian’s success in the Near East. Thanks to the manoeuvrability and tactical superiority of the heavy cavalry units, Aurelian managed to quickly reclaim the eastern provinces from Zenobia’s control.