International Rivalry in FDI Incentives and Strategic Responses
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 강문성 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-02T03:40:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-04-02T03:40:24Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2022-04-01 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1738-8112 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/139440 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose – As globalization continues to expand since the 1990s, competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) has intensified all over the world. This paper tried to explore strategic relationships among developing countries in a race to attract multinational corporations (MNCs). Design/Methodology/Approach – This study established a game-theoretical model with three stages, where governments of potential host countries set their policies to attract MNCs and impose a tariff on imported products. In addition, MNCs make their own locational decision after realizing policy sets of incentives and tariffs. Findings – This paper found that an MNC will make a locational decision considering market size, cost advantages, FDI incentives, and tariff burdens. This paper also found that countries with a smaller market size and a weaker cost advantage are likely to raise FDI incentives to attract MNCs. In addition, the host country will raise the FDI subsidy when a non-host rival country sets a higher tariff on exports of the host country. We also found that the non-host country, which lost the race of attracting the MNC, will raise its optimal tariff rate if it has a bigger market, and the host country has a weaker cost advantage. In addition, the non-host country will raise the optimal tariff rate when the host country provides a greater subsidy to the MNC. Research Implications – One of critical findings in this study is that the host country has no first-mover advantage in a race of FDI subsidies because it needs to provide a greater subsidy to attract the MNC when it moves first by providing FDI subsidies, and then the non-host country will react by imposing a tariff against the exports of the host country to the market of the non-host country. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | 한국무역연구원 | - |
dc.title | International Rivalry in FDI Incentives and Strategic Responses | - |
dc.title.alternative | International Rivalry in FDI Incentives and Strategic Responses | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | 강문성 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.16980/jitc.18.1.202202.17 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | 무역연구, v.18, no.1, pp.17 - 25 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | 무역연구 | - |
dc.citation.title | 무역연구 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 18 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 17 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 25 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART002817992 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 2 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Foreign Direct Investment | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Strategic Investment Policy | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Tax Incentives | - |
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