Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chee, S. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Matsunaga, S. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, S. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-27T06:40:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-08-27T06:40:38Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2022-08-25 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-09 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0278-4254 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/143569 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm's financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses. © 2022 Elsevier Inc. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Inc. | - |
dc.title | Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Chee, S. | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.106981 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85130384499 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000867554800003 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, v.41, no.5 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy | - |
dc.citation.volume | 41 | - |
dc.citation.number | 5 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Public Administration | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Public Administration | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CONTROL MATERIAL WEAKNESSES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MANAGEMENT | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | RESTATEMENTS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COMPENSATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DETERMINANTS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ASSOCIATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EXPERTISE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | IRREGULARITIES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CHOICE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STYLE | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Chief Financial Officer (CFO) | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Earnings restatement | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Management forecast error | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Outside director appointment | - |
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