Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kim, C. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, S.-H. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, J. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, J. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-12-11T09:40:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-12-11T09:40:31Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2022-12-08 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-2680 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/146972 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power. © 2022 Elsevier B.V. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier B.V. | - |
dc.title | Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Lee, J. | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85130313799 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | European Journal of Political Economy | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | European Journal of Political Economy | - |
dc.citation.title | European Journal of Political Economy | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article in Press | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Coalition bargaining | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Experiment | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Game theory | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Intermediate coalition formation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Non-core allocation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Veto game | - |
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
(02841) 서울특별시 성북구 안암로 14502-3290-1114
COPYRIGHT © 2021 Korea University. All Rights Reserved.
Certain data included herein are derived from the © Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics. All rights reserved.
You may not copy or re-distribute this material in whole or in part without the prior written consent of Clarivate Analytics.