Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms' performance?
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Hyungseok | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Woochan | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-30T13:00:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-30T13:00:58Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-19 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-10 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0306-686X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/52655 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms' performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control-ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | WILEY | - |
dc.subject | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | - |
dc.subject | BUSINESS GROUPS | - |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE | - |
dc.subject | GROUP AFFILIATION | - |
dc.subject | EMERGING MARKETS | - |
dc.subject | IMPACT | - |
dc.title | Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms' performance? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Kim, Woochan | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jbfa.12453 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85086162706 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000539140300001 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, v.47, no.9-10, pp.1268 - 1289 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING | - |
dc.citation.volume | 47 | - |
dc.citation.number | 9-10 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 1268 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 1289 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BUSINESS GROUPS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | GROUP AFFILIATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EMERGING MARKETS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | IMPACT | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | business group | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | cash flow right | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | chaebol | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | control-ownership disparity | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | executive compensation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | tunneling | - |
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