Group identification with (incomplete) preferences
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Cho, Wonki Jo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Saporiti, Alejandro | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-31T11:23:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-31T11:23:59Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-18 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-02 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1467-9779 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/57794 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider the problem of identifying members of a group based on individual opinions. Since agents do not have preferences in the model, properties of rules that concern preferences (e.g., strategy-proofness and efficiency) have not been studied in the literature. We fill this gap by working with a class of incomplete preferences derived directly from opinions. Our main result characterizes a new family of group identification rules, called voting-by-equitable-committees rules, using two well-known properties: strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. Our family contains as a special case the consent rules (Samet & Schmeidler. J. Econ. Theory, 110 (2003), pp. 213-233), which are symmetric and embody various degrees of liberalism and democracy; and it also includes dictatorial and oligarchic rules that value agents' opinions differently. In the presence of strategy-proofness, efficiency turns out to be equivalent to non-degeneracy (i.e., any agent may potentially be included or excluded from the group). This implies that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and equal treatment of equals if, and only if, it is a non-degenerate voting-by-equitable-committees rule. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | WILEY | - |
dc.subject | STRATEGY-PROOFNESS | - |
dc.subject | SOCIAL CHOICE | - |
dc.subject | AGGREGATION | - |
dc.subject | EQUIVALENCE | - |
dc.subject | NONMANIPULABILITY | - |
dc.subject | LIBERALISM | - |
dc.subject | RULES | - |
dc.title | Group identification with (incomplete) preferences | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Cho, Wonki Jo | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jpet.12387 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85070072416 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000479895900001 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, v.22, no.1, pp.170 - 189 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY | - |
dc.citation.volume | 22 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 170 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 189 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STRATEGY-PROOFNESS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SOCIAL CHOICE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | AGGREGATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUIVALENCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | NONMANIPULABILITY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | LIBERALISM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | RULES | - |
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