Information Asymmetry, Time until Deal Completion and Post-M&A PerformanceInformation Asymmetry, Time until Deal Completion and Post-M&A Performance
- Other Titles
- Information Asymmetry, Time until Deal Completion and Post-M&A Performance
- Authors
- Ephraim Kwashie Thompson; 김창기
- Issue Date
- 2020
- Publisher
- 한국파생상품학회
- Keywords
- M& A Performance; Time Until Deal Completion; Due Diligence Hypothesis; Overdue Hypothesis; Information Asymmetry
- Citation
- 선물연구, v.28, no.3, pp.321 - 346
- Indexed
- KCI
- Journal Title
- 선물연구
- Volume
- 28
- Number
- 3
- Start Page
- 321
- End Page
- 346
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/59540
- ISSN
- 1229-988X
- Abstract
- This paper aims to show that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the post-M&A performance-time until deal completion nexus. The findings are that the due diligence hypothesis and the overdue hypothesis proposed and tested in Thompson and Kim (2020) are influenced by the information asymmetry of the target during the negotiation process. Thus, mergers that involve more opaque targets that take a shorter time to close perform better, whereas those that take too long to close experience poor post-M&A performance. Conversely, there is no such effect when the mergers involve targets that are transparent and not plagued with large information asymmetry problems. These results hold for the short-term supporting the evidence that information asymmetry problems are severe before the merger is consummated and become attenuated post-merger.
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Collections - Korea University Business School > Department of Business Administration > 1. Journal Articles
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