Symmetric Equilibria in a Cost-Averting War of Attrition Requiring Minimum Necessary Conceders
- Authors
- Kim, Geoferey Jiyun; Kim, Bara
- Issue Date
- 1월-2018
- Publisher
- WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH
- Keywords
- Bellman equation; Nash equilibrium; public economics; trembling hand perfection; war of attrition
- Citation
- B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, v.18, no.1
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
- Volume
- 18
- Number
- 1
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/78475
- DOI
- 10.1515/bejte-2016-0109
- ISSN
- 1935-1704
- Abstract
- This paper provides an analysis of a cost-averting war of attrition with minimum necessary conceders. All symmetric stationary Nash equilibria are characterized. The multiplicity of equilibria has called for further refinements. We show that there exists a unique symmetric stationary trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Comparative statics results of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium are provided. This paper's model is motivated by the problem of delayed public goods provisions in collective action settings. Augmenting the number of minimum necessary conceders can curtail delays.
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