Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Shin, Jae Hyeok | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-02T21:07:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-02T21:07:35Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-16 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1357-2334 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/80884 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper I investigate how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver individual/local benefits instead of national public policies. I argue that, in the pork-dominant context, most legislators vote with the president, who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affiliations. Thus, the president's party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president. These arguments are supported with quantitative studies of the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives. It is found that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters' socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. These findings indicate that voters' high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine voting unity within the extremely cohesive pork-dominant legislature. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD | - |
dc.subject | ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS | - |
dc.subject | PARTY COHESION | - |
dc.subject | PERSONAL VOTE | - |
dc.subject | BEHAVIOR | - |
dc.subject | SYSTEMS | - |
dc.subject | DEFECTION | - |
dc.subject | DISTRICT | - |
dc.subject | BOSSISM | - |
dc.title | Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Shin, Jae Hyeok | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/13572334.2018.1516923 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85053408821 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000446054800005 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES, v.24, no.3, pp.338 - 358 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES | - |
dc.citation.volume | 24 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 338 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 358 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Government & Law | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Law | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PARTY COHESION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PERSONAL VOTE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BEHAVIOR | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SYSTEMS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DEFECTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DISTRICT | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BOSSISM | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Legislative behaviour | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | roll-call vote | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | voter demands | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | access to resources | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | pork-dominant system | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | the Philippines | - |
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