Incentives for discrimination
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Mialon, Sue H. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yoo, Seung Han | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-03T07:52:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-03T07:52:34Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-16 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017-04 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-2681 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/83985 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper models employers' incentives for discrimination against ex ante identical groups of workers when the workers must compete for a limited number of positions. Employers benefit from discrimination against minority workers because it can reduce the overall risk from workers' noisy signals by increasing the expected quality of "majority" workers and their chance to win the competition for the limited number of positions. We show that employers can influence the selection of a discriminatory equilibrium by choosing the set of finalists in competition primarily from a majority group, and favoring them when the two groups are equally qualified. We discuss the implications of equal opportunity laws in this context. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER | - |
dc.subject | ELIMINATE NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES | - |
dc.subject | STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION | - |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
dc.subject | MODEL | - |
dc.title | Incentives for discrimination | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Yoo, Seung Han | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.021 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85014750230 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000400535500010 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, v.136, pp.141 - 160 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | - |
dc.citation.volume | 136 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 141 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 160 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ELIMINATE NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MODEL | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Statistical discrimination | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Group inequality | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Asymmetric information | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Cross-group risks | - |
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