Corporate governance and executive perquisites
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Andrews, Angela | - |
dc.contributor.author | Linn, Scott | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yi, Han | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-03T15:27:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-03T15:27:46Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-16 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1475-7702 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/86468 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive perquisite consumption and indicators of corporate governance after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded the disclosure requirements related to perquisites. Design/methodology/approach - This study uses ordinary least squares and Tobit regressions to examine the dollar value of perquisites consumed, the number of perquisites consumed and the types of perquisites consumed. Findings - The analysis shows that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. Firms characterized as being more prone to the presence of agency problems are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption. Finally, there is evidence that not all perquisite consumptions can be attributed to an agency problem. Efficiently operating firms are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption as are larger firms. Research limitations/implications - The authors examine firms in the period immediately after the SEC initiated the expanded disclosures. This may limit the generalizability of the results to other exchange-listed firms that changed their perquisite policy as a result of the rule change. Originality/value - The paper extends the literature on corporate governance and mandatory corporate disclosure by investigating the association between corporate governance characteristics and perquisite consumption. This paper examines this relation immediately after the SEC expanded the disclosures surrounding perquisites to provide the public with more transparent disclosures. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LTD | - |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET | - |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS | - |
dc.subject | ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE | - |
dc.subject | EQUITY OWNERSHIP | - |
dc.subject | AGENCY PROBLEMS | - |
dc.subject | FIRM | - |
dc.subject | DIVERSIFICATION | - |
dc.subject | COMPENSATION | - |
dc.subject | COSTS | - |
dc.subject | ASSOCIATION | - |
dc.title | Corporate governance and executive perquisites | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Yi, Han | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1108/RAF-10-2014-0116 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85011850876 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000398658100002 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, v.16, no.1, pp.21 - 45 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | - |
dc.citation.title | REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | - |
dc.citation.volume | 16 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 21 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 45 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUITY OWNERSHIP | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | AGENCY PROBLEMS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | FIRM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DIVERSIFICATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COMPENSATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COSTS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ASSOCIATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Executive compensation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Agency costs | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Corporate governance | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Perquisites (" | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Perks" | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | ) | - |
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