When heirs become major shareholders: Evidence on pyramiding financed by related-party sales
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hwang, Sunwoo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Woochan | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-03T16:31:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-03T16:31:55Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-16 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-12 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/86755 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study investigates how related-party sales are used as a means to financially support the firms in which heirs become major shareholders and allow them to strengthen control over other firms in the group through pyramiding. From a universe of Korean chaebol firms during 2000-2011, we identify a subset of firms where heirs become major shareholders (treatment group) and compare them against their propensity-score-matched firms (control group) before and after the ownership change. A series of difference-in-differences tests with firm fixed effects reveal that treatment group firms experience greater related-party sales, benefit from them in terms of earnings, and gain importance in controlling other firms in the group. However, we do not find these results when non-heirs (e.g., controlling shareholders and other relatives) become major shareholders. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | - |
dc.subject | BUSINESS GROUPS | - |
dc.subject | FIRM PERFORMANCE | - |
dc.subject | FAMILY | - |
dc.subject | SUCCESSION | - |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP | - |
dc.subject | MARKETS | - |
dc.title | When heirs become major shareholders: Evidence on pyramiding financed by related-party sales | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Hwang, Sunwoo | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Kim, Woochan | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.08.013 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84985018993 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000389095000002 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, v.41, pp.23 - 42 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | - |
dc.citation.volume | 41 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 23 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 42 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BUSINESS GROUPS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | FIRM PERFORMANCE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | FAMILY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SUCCESSION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | OWNERSHIP | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKETS | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Family firm | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Business group | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Chaebol | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Succession | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Related-party transaction | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Control-enhancement | - |
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