최후통첩 게임에서의 개인의사결정 vs. 그룹의사결정: 그룹 간 경쟁의 의한 조절효과

Abstract

We live under the consequences of countless decisions, among which significant number of decisions is made by representatives acting on behalf of us. However, individuals often make disparate decisions depending on which identity they are assigned as an agent or with which opponent they are interplaying. In the current research, behavioral discontinuity depending upon actor identity and social relationship was investigated using the ultimatum game. Participants behaved in a more economically rational way when they acted as a group representative compared with when they made decisions as a private individual. However, the direction of the individual-representative discontinuity was reversed when rivalry came into play. Furthermore, more fairness was requested to accept the offers in the interaction with the rival compared with the neutral countergroup. Especially when interacting with the rival group, participants showed contrasting level of decision bias - measured by rejection rate toward unfair offers - according to the degree of mind attribution to the opponent. Specifically, the greater participants attributed a mind to the rival group, the more they rejected the unfair offers from it. The present research is important in that it provides insight into individuals’ decision-making in a group context, which sometimes forgoes the financial gain of the entire group and ultimately leads to the sub-optimization of social welfare.