Timing and Sequencing of Reforms For Human Rights Protection: What Should Be Done First?

Abstract

Recent studies suggest that democratic institutions without proper government capacity or liberal institutions are hard to be consolidated and do not increase or may even decrease peace, prosperity, and human rights protection. If not democratic institutions, what factor(s) initiate(s) human rights protection? When should democratic institutions be built? Does democratic institution building have to precede or follow state building or liberal institution building? To answer these questions, this study explores two issues: parameter heterogeneity in the relationships between human rights protection and its determinants; (inter)dependence between the democratic effect and other effects. The quantile regression results show that institutional democracy does not work in countries with serious human rights problems whereas judicial independence, press freedom, and international organization ameliorate human rights problems in those countries, which suggests that democracy should come later. However, the analysis of interaction effects shows that democracy and other factors condition each other, which in turn suggests that democracy had better come as soon as possible.