Saving Human Rights from Cultural Relativism with Compassion

Abstract

How can we justify the idea of universal human rights? Can wesave universal human rights from cultural relativism with compassionrather than reason? Reason has served as the predominant basis ofhuman rights since the era of Enlightenment. However, an adequatesource of human rights required today is decisively universal, but atthe same time considerably sensitive to the abundant diversity ofmoral values. We respond to this question by critically examining thehuman rights theories of Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum, alongwith moral sentiment theories of David Hume and Adam Smith. Weargue first that moral sentiment is no less a foundational source thancontextual; second, compassion rather than reason constitutes thefoundational source of human beings. In developing each point, wesubject to careful analysis of Hume's view on the foundation ofmorality and Smith's idea of the impartial spectator. Reason andcompassion are both essential for an individual to be moral, but, moreimportantly, we argue that compassion is the source of moralitywhich makes every human being entitled to universal human rights.