차등의결권 주식의 도입가능성에 대한 연구
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 김정호 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-05T13:17:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-05T13:17:16Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1229-3261 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/99909 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Nowadays we see many cases, in which the incumbent managers or controlling shareholders have some 'super-voting' or 'weighted voting' stocks. Such phenomina are so prevalent worldwide, that we could not escape ourselves from reconsidering the validity of one-share-one-vote principle. The world-famous football club Manchester United, luxury giant Louis Vuitton, the IT innovator Google and the sportsware pioneer Nike, these are only a small portion of cases, where an 'extreme governance' renders a peaceful and stable leadership to the incumbent managers of the promising corporations. In U.S., the Delaware General Corporation Act does not prohibit any sort of dual class common stock. The british, french, danish, hollandish, swedish or italian companies enjoy also the same trend in their business world. German Stock Corporation Act permits also some sort of dual class voting system - capped voting and scaled voting plan - for a non-listed company. In Japan, the recently (2006) codified "Company Act" permits a 'unit-based' voting system, where the shareholder, who possesses less than 'the unit', could have no voting power at all. Korea became nowadays an exception from these trends. There has been some hot discussion on the way to introduce a possible dual class stock in the "Commercial Code Book" or in any special statutes in Korea. The author chose a simple addition to the existing section 369 subsection (1) of Korean Commercial Code as follows ; "Unless otherwise mentioned in the certificate of association, all the shareholders enjoy the one-share-one-vote principle." | - |
dc.language | Korean | - |
dc.language.iso | ko | - |
dc.publisher | 한국경영법률학회 | - |
dc.title | 차등의결권 주식의 도입가능성에 대한 연구 | - |
dc.title.alternative | A Study on the Dual Class Common Stock - Primarily Searching for A Possible Path to Introduce in Korea - | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | 김정호 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | 경영법률, v.24, no.2, pp.129 - 164 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | 경영법률 | - |
dc.citation.title | 경영법률 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 24 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 129 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 164 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001862395 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 2 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 1주 1의결권 원칙 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 1인 1표주의 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 신중한 중위투표 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 복수의결권주식 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 의결권 상한제 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 기간부 의결권제 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 체감부 의결권 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | one-share-one-vote principle | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | one-member-one-vote principle | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | prudent mean vote | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | dual class stock | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | capped voting plan | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | time phased voting plan | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | scaled voting plan | - |
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