Managerial Ownership and Financial Analysts' Information Environment

  • Han, Sam; 
  • Jin, Justin Yiqiang; 
  • Kang, Tony; 
  • Lobo, Gerald
Citations

WEB OF SCIENCE

20
Citations

SCOPUS

25

초록

Despite the importance of sell-side financial analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market, little is known about how managerial equity ownership is associated with their information environment. Using Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens' (1998) framework for measuring the precision of financial analysts' information, we observe that managerial ownership is positively associated with the precision of financial analysts' public (common) and private (idiosyncratic) information, largely consistent with the alignment view of managerial equity ownership. These results are robust to controlling for various economic and statistical factors that might affect the inference.

키워드

incentive alignment; information environment; information precision; managerial ownership; FOUNDING-FAMILY OWNERSHIP; EQUITY INCENTIVES; CONFERENCE CALLS; EARNINGS; MANAGEMENT; DISCLOSURE; MARKET; FORECASTS; FIRM; COMPENSATION
제목
Managerial Ownership and Financial Analysts' Information Environment
저자
Han, Sam; Jin, Justin Yiqiang; Kang, Tony; Lobo, Gerald
DOI
10.1111/jbfa.12070
발행일
2014-04
유형
Article
저널명
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
권
41
호
3-4
페이지
328 ~ 362