The drivers of international corporate entrepreneurship: CEO incentive and CEO monitoring mechanisms

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30
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SCOPUS

31

초록

This study examines international corporate entrepreneurship associated with new product lines and new geographic markets. Drawing upon agency theory and the corporate entrepreneurship literature, we posit that aligning CEO incentives with shareholder interests and adopting CEO monitoring mechanisms will promote international corporate entrepreneurship. We test the hypotheses using 277 U.S.-based manufacturing firms during the period from 2003 to 2009. Our findings highlight how various governance mechanisms such as a CEO's compensation linked to the long-term performance of the firm, the values of the CEO's shareholding, independent board leadership, and the representation of outside directors influence international corporate entrepreneurship of existing firms. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

키워드

International corporate entrepreneurship; Risky international expansion; Agency problem; Chief executive officer; Incentive alignment; Monitoring mechanism; MARKET ENTRY MODE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; BOARD COMPOSITION; AGENCY THEORY; OWNERSHIP; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; RISK; ORIENTATION
제목
The drivers of international corporate entrepreneurship: CEO incentive and CEO monitoring mechanisms
저자
Wang, Yu-Kai (Mike); Chung, Chris Changwha; Lim, Dominic S. K.
DOI
10.1016/j.jwb.2015.02.002
발행일
2015-10
유형
Article
저널명
Journal of World Business
권
50
호
4
페이지
742 ~ 753