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Promoting industrial water conservation: evolutionary pathways under government regulation and public preferences
- Sun, Dongying;
- Ouyang, Zhaolin;
- Jung, Donghwi
WEB OF SCIENCE
1초록
As a major source of water consumption and pollution, the water industry faces an urgent need to transition toward more water-efficient practices. However, how government regulation and public engagement can effectively promote this transition remains an open question. This study develops an evolutionary game model involving government and industrial enterprises under two scenarios and analyzes the stability of strategic equilibria. The results show that, in the absence of public participation, convergence to a water-saving equilibrium requires more stringent conditions. Simulation analyses further indicate that government rewards and penalties constrain and accelerate the evolution of industrial water-saving strategies. In addition, subsidies for watersaving technologies, differences in perceived utility, and the intensity of public supervisionfactors that increase water-saving returns-significantly shape the evolutionary trajectory of industrial water conservation. Overall, the study offers a novel analytical framework highlighting the synergistic role of government, industry, and the public in advancing sustainable industrial water conservation.
키워드
- 제목
- Promoting industrial water conservation: evolutionary pathways under government regulation and public preferences
- 저자
- Sun, Dongying; Ouyang, Zhaolin; Jung, Donghwi
- 발행일
- 2026-03
- 유형
- Article
- 권
- 90
- 페이지
- 285 ~ 307