Promoting industrial water conservation: evolutionary pathways under government regulation and public preferences

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초록

As a major source of water consumption and pollution, the water industry faces an urgent need to transition toward more water-efficient practices. However, how government regulation and public engagement can effectively promote this transition remains an open question. This study develops an evolutionary game model involving government and industrial enterprises under two scenarios and analyzes the stability of strategic equilibria. The results show that, in the absence of public participation, convergence to a water-saving equilibrium requires more stringent conditions. Simulation analyses further indicate that government rewards and penalties constrain and accelerate the evolution of industrial water-saving strategies. In addition, subsidies for watersaving technologies, differences in perceived utility, and the intensity of public supervisionfactors that increase water-saving returns-significantly shape the evolutionary trajectory of industrial water conservation. Overall, the study offers a novel analytical framework highlighting the synergistic role of government, industry, and the public in advancing sustainable industrial water conservation.

키워드

Industrial enterprisesWater-saving strategyGovernment regulationPublic preferencesEvolutionary game theoryGREEN SUPPLY CHAINGAME ANALYSISMODELSELECTIONPOLICIESIMPACTENERGY
제목
Promoting industrial water conservation: evolutionary pathways under government regulation and public preferences
저자
Sun, DongyingOuyang, ZhaolinJung, Donghwi
DOI
10.1016/j.eap.2026.01.026
발행일
2026-03
유형
Article
저널명
Economic Analysis and Policy
90
페이지
285 ~ 307