공적 옴부즈맨과 공무원 집단의 전략적 관계분석

Abstract

This paper studies strategic interactions between an independent public ombudsman and a large group of public officials. We first establish the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, and then provide two main comparative static results. First, we show that if the population distribution of officials shifts to one with a higher personal cost of corruption, or if the net benefit of corruption decreases, then the equilibrium proportion of corrupt officials decreases. Second, if the independent public ombudsman “strengthens” the precision level for the Central Limit Theorem, then the equilibrium proportion decreases. It follows from the two comparative static analyses that this paper sheds light on the government’s feasible policy set consisting of officials’ net benefit and the precision level. Last, we derive the optimal precision level endogenously, and discuss how the benefit and cost of corruption are related to the optimal level.