A stag hunt game with social norms
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Yoo, S.H. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-06T10:02:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-06T10:02:24Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1229-2893 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/105994 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player's payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria. Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework, the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases; and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.title | A stag hunt game with social norms | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Yoo, S.H. | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84884967028 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.24, no.3, pp.306 - 319 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.volume | 24 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 306 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 319 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001806514 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Social norms | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Stag hunt game | - |
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