A stag hunt game with social norms
- Authors
- Yoo, S.H.
- Issue Date
- 2013
- Keywords
- Social norms; Stag hunt game
- Citation
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.24, no.3, pp.306 - 319
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
- Volume
- 24
- Number
- 3
- Start Page
- 306
- End Page
- 319
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/105994
- ISSN
- 1229-2893
- Abstract
- This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player's payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria. Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework, the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases; and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms.
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Collections - College of Political Science & Economics > Department of Economics > 1. Journal Articles
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