Evolutionary stability in games with continuous strategy space: Recent developments
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lee, W. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-07T04:21:07Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-07T04:21:07Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1229-2893 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/110714 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The classical evolutionary game theory, pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), was initially developed in the context of uni-population games with discrete strategy space. Recently some progress has been made in extending the original idea of Maynard Smith and his collaborators into uni-population games with continuous strategy space (Apaloo, 1997; Christiansen, 1991; Cressman, 2006; Eshel, 1983). The current paper reviews them in a unifying framework, and provides some new theorems linking various concepts of evolutionary stability proposed by different authors. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.title | Evolutionary stability in games with continuous strategy space: Recent developments | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Lee, W. | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84859366705 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.23, no.1, pp.63 - 78 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.volume | 23 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 63 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 78 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Review | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001645642 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Continuous stability | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Evolutionarily stable non-invader strategy | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Local m-stability | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Local superiority | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Nash equilibrium | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Uninvadability | - |
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