Evolutionary stability in games with continuous strategy space: Recent developments
- Authors
- Lee, W.
- Issue Date
- 2012
- Keywords
- Continuous stability; Evolutionarily stable non-invader strategy; Local m-stability; Local superiority; Nash equilibrium; Uninvadability
- Citation
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.23, no.1, pp.63 - 78
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
- Volume
- 23
- Number
- 1
- Start Page
- 63
- End Page
- 78
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/110714
- ISSN
- 1229-2893
- Abstract
- The classical evolutionary game theory, pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), was initially developed in the context of uni-population games with discrete strategy space. Recently some progress has been made in extending the original idea of Maynard Smith and his collaborators into uni-population games with continuous strategy space (Apaloo, 1997; Christiansen, 1991; Cressman, 2006; Eshel, 1983). The current paper reviews them in a unifying framework, and provides some new theorems linking various concepts of evolutionary stability proposed by different authors.
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Collections - College of Political Science & Economics > Department of Economics > 1. Journal Articles
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