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ANTI-LIMIT PRICING
- Authors
- Jun, Byoung Heon; Park, In-Uck
- Issue Date
- 12월-2010
- Publisher
- HITOTSUBASHI UNIV
- Keywords
- Dynamic signaling; limit pricing; entry deterrence
- Citation
- HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, v.51, no.2, pp.57 - 78
- Indexed
- SSCI
AHCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
- Volume
- 51
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 57
- End Page
- 78
- ISSN
- 0018-280X
- Abstract
- Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent may use its current price to signal its strength, in order to deter entry. In contrast with conventional limit pricing, we show that due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly profits, the incumbent may want to signal its weakness to invite the entry of weaker firms. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this phenomenon to arise in equilibrium, in the benchmark cases that no second entry is profitable.
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