Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
- Authors
- Ju, Biung-Ghi
- Issue Date
- 4월-2010
- Publisher
- SPRINGER
- Citation
- SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, v.34, no.4, pp.571 - 596
- Indexed
- SSCI
AHCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
- Volume
- 34
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 571
- End Page
- 596
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/116747
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00355-009-0418-0
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
- Abstract
- We introduce a notion of conditionally decisive powers the exercise of which depends on social consent. Decisive powers, or the so-called libertarian rights, are examples and much weaker forms of powers are covered by our notion. We provide an axiomatic characterization of existence of a system of powers and its uniqueness as well as characterizations of various families of rules represented by systems of powers. Critical axioms are monotonicity, independence and symmetric linkage (person i and i's issues should be treated symmetrically to person j and j's issues for at least one linkage between issues and persons).
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Collections - College of Political Science & Economics > Department of Economics > 1. Journal Articles
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