Reputation and Cooperation in Voluntary Exchanges: Comparing Local and Central Institutions
- Authors
- Ahn, T. K.; Esarey, Justin; ScholZ, John T.
- Issue Date
- 4월-2009
- Publisher
- CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
- Keywords
- reputation cooperation prisoner' s dilemma
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF POLITICS, v.71, no.2, pp.398 - 413
- Indexed
- SCIE
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF POLITICS
- Volume
- 71
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 398
- End Page
- 413
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/120286
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0022381609090355
- ISSN
- 0022-3816
- Abstract
- our experimental study compares the effectiveness of three reputation mechanisms believed to enhance cooperation. Groups of 14 subjects repeatedly select partners, play two-person prisoner's dilemmas, and rely only on individual experience to find trustworthy exchange partners in the baseline condition. The local condition represents emergent, bottom-up networks that allow partners to voluntarily share recommendations. The central condition represents designed, top-down institutions that allow wide dissemination of recommendations provided voluntarily. Surprisingly, the greater provision and use of information in the local condition supports the highest level of cooperation, suggesting an unrecognized advantage of exchange networks over centralized institutions in credibility and information provision.
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Collections - College of Political Science & Economics > Department of Public Administration > 1. Journal Articles
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