ITQ, 불확실성, 퇴출비용, 실물옵션

Abstract

The primary purpose of ITQ(individually transferable quota) is to reduce the overcapitalization problem in the open-access fishery. It has been argued that the least cost-efficient vessels under ITQ may exit first from the fishing by selling their quotas, thereby also reducing the excess capital. The purpose of this paper is to provide a case when ITQ may prompt the exit of less cost-inefficient vessels in the presence of irreversible exit cost which is proportional to the cost-inefficiency. Real option model is adopted in order to analyze the source of hysteresis associated with fishery exit decision. By linking the interaction between vessels’ adjustment costs, cost-efficiency of harvest and uncertainty of fishery return, we show that cost-inefficient vessels will not exit always first from the fishery in contrast to the conventional wisdom. Relevant policy implications is discussed.