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The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
- Authors
- Yoon, Kiho
- Issue Date
- 2월-2008
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
- Keywords
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism; double auction; participation fees; asymptotic efficiency
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, v.44, no.3-4, pp.324 - 336
- Indexed
- SCIE
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
- Volume
- 44
- Number
- 3-4
- Start Page
- 324
- End Page
- 336
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- Abstract
- This paper introduces the participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which satisfies both ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We bound the efficiency loss of this mechanism by a parameter that captures the structure of marginal contributions to the social welfare. We then apply the theory to quite general multiple unit double auction problems to show that the participatory VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic efficiency. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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