1968년 북한의 푸에블로호 나포 원인에 대한 연구

Abstract

This paper seeks to analyze the decision-making process of the Johnson Administration regarding North Korea's capture of the USS Pueblo. On January 23rd, 1968, the intelligence gathering ship USS Pueblo was captured by North Korean Navy in the international waters in front of Wonsan Port. Then the U.S. took initiatives on a major military build-up in the East Coast of Korean Peninsula and reinforced the air forces based in Korea, intensifying a serious security crisis for a second war in 15 years after the Korean War in 1953. The Johnson Administration not only perceived the Pueblo incident as a severe threat to its security interests in Northeast Asia, but also saw it as a significant challenge for securing its national interest and international strategies in the Asian region. Therefore, this paper raises the question on why North Korea decided to capture the USS Pueblo despite the U.S.'s military retaliation possibility. The paper suggests four possible reasons behind North Korea's decision; a conspiracy theory which involves Soviet Union, North Korea's strategic liaison with North Vietnam, North Korea's attempt to test the possibilities to provoke a war, and North Korea's domestic political reasons. However, after an extensive analysis based on historical structuralism, the paper finds North Korea's domestic political reasons to be the best suitable explanation behind North Korea's decision to seize USS Pueblo.