Why do so few public school districts use merit pay?
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Goldhaber, D. | - |
dc.contributor.author | DeArmond, M. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Player, D. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Choi, H.-J. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T15:54:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T15:54:31Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-17 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0098-9495 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/125342 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article presents a principal-agent model in the context of public schools to help explain the use of merit pay for teachers. The model considers how both the nature of teaching and the political costs of union resistance affect school district merit pay decisions. Our results support the idea that merit pay is more likely in environments where there is more performance information and less likely where teachers are unionized. The negative effect from unions, however, appears stronger than the positive effect of performance information. We also find that teachers in merit pay districts earn more than their counterparts in non-merit pay districts. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.title | Why do so few public school districts use merit pay? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Choi, H.-J. | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-40749104126 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Education Finance, v.33, no.3, pp.262 - 289 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Education Finance | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Education Finance | - |
dc.citation.volume | 33 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 262 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 289 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Merit Pay | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Principal-agent model | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | teachers union | - |
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
(02841) 서울특별시 성북구 안암로 14502-3290-1114
COPYRIGHT © 2021 Korea University. All Rights Reserved.
Certain data included herein are derived from the © Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics. All rights reserved.
You may not copy or re-distribute this material in whole or in part without the prior written consent of Clarivate Analytics.