Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures
- Authors
- Park, D.; Kim, G.; Heo, D.; Kim, S.; Kim, H.; Hong, S.
- Issue Date
- Mar-2021
- Publisher
- Korean Institute of Communication Sciences
- Keywords
- Low-density parity-check code; Quantum key distribution; Security; Side-channel attack; Single trace attack
- Citation
- ICT Express, v.7, no.1, pp 36 - 40
- Pages
- 5
- Indexed
- SCIE
SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- ICT Express
- Volume
- 7
- Number
- 1
- Start Page
- 36
- End Page
- 40
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/129119
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.icte.2021.01.013
- ISSN
- 2405-9595
2405-9595
- Abstract
- Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender's side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks. © 2021 The Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences (KICS)
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Collections - Graduate School > Department of Cyber Security > 1. Journal Articles
- School of Cyber Security > Department of Information Security > 1. Journal Articles
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