윌리엄스의 “너무 많이 생각함” 반론에 대한 재고찰

Abstract

Bernard Williams contended famously that if an agent thinks it is morally permissible to save his wife from danger when a stranger is also in peril, and only one of them can be saved, he has had “one thought too many.” Williams raised this “one thought too many” objection to impartial moral theory. One of the primary intentions of this paper is to dismiss some misunderstanding of the objection so that it receives the fair treatment it deserves. First, one standard response to the “one thought too many” objection is that even those committed to impartial morality do not generally appeal to it at the time of action. However, this rejoinder is based on a misguided view of the objection, because Williams argues that the full content of a person’s motivating cognition, whether at the time of an action or otherwise, need not include the idea of moral permissibility. Second, those who believe that the charge of “having one thought too many” is identical to the notion of “one and only one thought” may complain that William’s contention is based on an unduly restricted view of human psychology. However, the proponents of such a view ignore that Williams does accept that people’s motivations can be as dissimilar as their characters and projects. I demonstrate that this in no way undermines his basic insights vis-à-vis the indictment of impartial morality.