Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Geofferey Jiyun | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Bara | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jeongsim | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-01T12:53:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-01T12:53:04Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-19 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019-07 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-6377 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/64255 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | - |
dc.subject | GENERALIZED WAR | - |
dc.subject | GAMES | - |
dc.title | Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Kim, Bara | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.005 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85067255675 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000474502700017 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS, v.47, no.4, pp.326 - 330 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | - |
dc.citation.title | OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 47 | - |
dc.citation.number | 4 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 326 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 330 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Operations Research & Management Science | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Operations Research & Management Science | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | GENERALIZED WAR | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | GAMES | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | War of attrition | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Incomplete information | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | - |
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